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The objective of the research is to develop an accurate system for indoor location
estimation using a secure architecture based on the IEEE 802.11 standard for in-
frastructure networks. Elements of this secure architecture include: server-oriented
platform for greater trust and manageability; multiple wireless network parameters
for improved accuracy; and Support Vector Regression (SVR) for accurate, high-
resolution estimates. While these elements have been investigated individually in
earlier research, none has combined them to a single security-oriented system. Thus
this research investigates the feasibility of using these elements together.
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CHAPTER 2
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
2.1 IEEE 802.11
What is commonly known as IEEE 802.11 actually refers to the family of standards
that include the original IEEE 802.11 itself, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, and IEEE
802.11g. Other common names include Wi-Fi and Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN).
IEEE 802.11 has become virtually ubiquitous as a wireless computer networking
standard and is poised to enter even the mobile voice communications sector. With
such significant market penetration, IEEE 802.11 will remain a leader even in the
face of the existing competing and emerging standards.
For the purposes of this research, it is important to note an important dichotomy in
IEEE 802.11 networks: infrastructure networks ad hoc networks. IEEE 802.11 speci-
fies these two network architectures[1], each with its own benefits and disadvantages[2].
Briefly, infrastructure networks rely on a fixed network infrastructure to facilitate
communications between the mobiles nodes (known as stations in the standard) and
ad hoc networks have the mobile nodes communicate directly with each other. Infra-
structure networks are more costly to set up, but offer generally better performance
and manageability. They are vastly more popular than ad hoc networks.
2.2 Location information and services
In wired networks, the network address is usually strongly correlated to the physical
location of the node. However, with wireless networks, the nodes tend to be highly
mobile and this is no longer the case. In spite of this, it is often useful, and sometimes
even necessary, to ground the network location in the physical world[3].
Location information is useful, and in both fixed and mobile networks, location
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information is often used for management purposes. However, in a mobile context,
the value of location information increases significantly as it provides novel function-
ality over previously fixed wired networks[4]. Many location-aware applications have
already been proposed[5, 6] or even commercially deployed[7, 8]. Further applications
are discussed in Section 2.6.
The IEEE 802.11 standard makes no provisions for location information[1]. This
deficiency has to be addressed using additional systems to extract location information
and present them to the user.
Location information needs to be placed within some frame of reference. For
example, Global Positioning System (GPS) units generally operate using a terrestrial
frame of reference, using the Greenwich meridian and the equator. Other systems
with smaller coverage areas choose a more appropriate reference frame, such as the
south-west corner of the region or even with respect to other users.
Location information is complex, not merely a set of Cartesian coordinates[9].
A location service collects and stores location information and provides access to
such information. Other applications providing value-added services and information
may then obtain the location information from the location service. The location
service may even be integrated with other systems providing related data to form a
Geographic Information System (GIS).
2.3 Current location systems
There exists a variety of systems that provide location information for outdoor, net-
work and non-network use. Probably the most well known non-network system is the
GPS[10]. Among the network-oriented systems, there is the well-publicized Enhanced
911 (E911) wireless services established by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC)[11]1. However, these outdoor systems do not face the same unique technical
1There are concerns for using the E911 system for Voice-over-IP (VoIP) phones, even for fixed
lines. A location service for wireless networks can help.
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challenges of similar indoor systems.
Indoor location systems face a somewhat harsher environment which results in
complex radio propagation patterns in all but the simplest of set ups. These propa-
gation patterns are generally site-specific and are characterized by poor Line of Sight
(LOS) and severe multi-path conditions[4]. These greatly limit the use of simple
triangulation algorithms that form the core of other systems like GPS.
Location systems use fixed reference points at known locations from which to
determine the location of the user. If there is no existing wireless network infra-
structure, most deployments use specialized hardware in the form of beacons or tags
operating on RF or infrared. These may use triangulation if several beacons or sen-
sors are deployed in a single small area. Alternatively, the systems may use one or
more beacons or sensors to detect presence in a given area, rather than provide pre-
cise coordinates. For environments with an existing wireless network, it is generally
more cost-effective to utilize the equipment that has already been deployed, be it the
mobile nodes themselves or other network infrastructure. The use of mobile nodes or
fixed infrastructure usually depends on whether the network is operating in ad hoc
or infrastructure mode.
2.3.1 Ad hoc systems
Ad hoc wireless networks may be deployed indoors or outdoors. The outdoor sce-
nario (e.g. for emergency services and military networks) is beyond the scope of this
research. These focus mostly on sensor networks and provide coordinates using some
form of triangulation using the Received Signal Strength (RSS)[12], Time of Arrival
(TOA)[13, 14], and Angle of Arrival (AOA)[15] measurements, or provide relative lo-
cation estimation based on connectivity with neighboring nodes[16]. Indoor scenarios
are affected significantly by the presence of reflectors and attenuators[14]. Otherwise,




IEEE 802.11 infrastructure networks do not afford the same flexibility as ad hoc
networks with regard to deployment and are generally in-building systems. Unlike ad
hoc networks, infrastructure networks are at least partially fixed, and often the fixed
access points are used as reference points for location estimation.
There are two possible approaches for location estimation when using the fixed in-
frastructure as reference points. Most commercial systems utilize the simpler method,
which is to provide a very approximate guess based on the sensor or access point which
receives the strongest signal or has connectivity[17, 18]. The mobile node is then as-
sumed to be in the vicinity of that particular access point or sensor. This method has
poor resolution and poor accuracy. It is able to resolve only as many zones as there are
sensors. Its accuracy is questionable because it assumes that a strong signal indicates
closer physical proximity, which is not always the case in an indoor environment.
The more complex method is using a radio map. This technique factors measure-
ments from multiple sensors or access points and is discussed in greater detail in Sec-
tion 2.3.3. It is able to provide greater resolution and accuracy than the näive method
described above. There are some commercial systems implementing this method[8, 19]
and many research systems[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
Most systems implementing the radio map technique use a user-centric architec-
ture shown in Figure 1. The user’s device performs the measurements, and often the
calculations, necessary to determine the user’s position. This may then be transmit-
ted to a server for storage or tracking.
2.3.3 Radio map technique
The radio map technique is founded on the premise that each location can be uniquely
identified by a radio “fingerprint” measured at the sensors. Most systems use the RSS
measured at each sensor to form a tuple that serves as the fingerprint. Other possible








Figure 1. Typical architecture of location systems for IEEE 802.11.
Round Trip Time (RTT)[35].
Even in the common case of RSS, the measured values do not vary linearly with
location. Obviously, in an indoor environment, attenuation is a significant factor.
The complex indoor environment also presents a host of reflectors, scatterers, and
diffractors, making multi-path effects such as phase cancellation and delay spread a
major concern.
Unfortunately, most current IEEE 802.11 hardware are only able to measure such
effects indirectly using the RSS or vague qualitative measures such as signal qual-
ity (hence the predominance of applications using the RSS). In the future, as the
radio hardware becomes more complex, such as in IEEE 802.11n (Wi-Fi Multiple
In/Multiple Out (MIMO)), it may be possible to obtain more accurate measures of
these phenomena.
The wavelengths at which IEEE 802.11 operates (approximately 12.5 cm at 2.4
GHz and 5.5 cm at 5 GHz) may result periodic fading (due to phase cancellation) with
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frequencies on a similar physical scale. Under ideal conditions, it may be possible to
exploit this periodic fading to pinpoint the location of the mobile node[27].
The radio map technique usually utilizes empirical measurements obtained through
a site survey[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. However, the values may
also be computed using a mathematical model of the radio environment, a technique
known as radio propagation modeling[32, 33, 34]. Both methods have been used in
various other implementations to varying degrees of success, however the empirical
method is more popular. This is because it is difficult to accurately model the envi-
ronment, with all details such as building materials and furnishings, and this is made
worse by dynamic influences such as doors, electrical appliances, and people.
Given the non-linear variations in the RSS, the small signal variations, and numer-
ous other factors which may affect each measurement, it is nearly impossible to simply
match results from a previously obtained radio map against current measurements
to determine a user’s present location. A certain amount of tolerance to errors in
measurement is required. Furthermore, there is a significant limit to the granularity
of the map obtained through the empirical method and the values at points between
those actually surveyed are not easy to predict. All these mean that matching a new
set of measurements to the map has to be done “intelligently.”
Various algorithms have been used to do the matching, from reasonably straight-
forward approaches like k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) to more complex statistical meth-
ods like Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and other techniques that involve machine
learning. Similarly, improving the granularity of the map is usually done by interpo-
lation or time averaging[36, 37].
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2.4 Secure location services
The primary goal of this research is to develop a location estimation system suitable
for security-related applications and other applications that require trusted and accu-
rate location data. Examples of such applications are location-based authentication[3,
38, 39] and location-based billing.
2.5 Requirements of a secure location service








These requirements are broad and not intended specifically for IEEE 802.11-based
systems. Nevertheless, these are still useful in constructing a new architecture and
determining its feasibility. The attributes tend to be closely related and, generally,
providing for one would also support the other attributes.
The four main aspects that this proposed research specifically focuses on are:
Accuracy The deviation of the estimates from the true location must be minimal
and the resolution of the system must be sufficiently fine-grained.
Integrity The data (both radio measurements and location information) must be
protected from tampering, or if tampering occurs, it must be evident.
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Availability The location information must be available when it is needed and as
often as the need arises.
Secrecy The data can only be accessed by authorized users.
These can be viewed as a simplification of [40] and encompass the same areas.
Current research on location estimation in IEEE 802.11 networks focus on the first
aspect, accuracy, and overlook the security aspect entirely.
2.5.1 Accuracy
The requirement for accuracy is not difficult to understand. The general definition of
accuracy actually quantifies two properties: the Euclidean distance between the actual
and estimated physical locations (the error distance), and the probability of each error
distance. Often, for ease of comparison, these two attributes are condensed to a single
value by taking the Root-Mean-Square (RMS) at the expense of some details[41]. For
a majority of applications, this measure of accuracy is the only reasonable one.
There are still many situations where accuracy is only a concern in terms of the
ability to discern between the various zones, i.e. the resolution of the system. Zones
are physical areas in which different policies (i.e. security or billing) are enforced. They
may be as small as one room in a building or as large as a metropolitan area. For
the purposes of most indoor networks, it is assumed that the smallest zone would be
a room. However, the system developed will operate on continuous coordinates with
respect to some origin. The ability of the system to differentiate between locations
in different rooms will be derived from these coordinates.
The accuracy of various approaches found in literature may vary significantly with
the experimental parameters, thus it is not possible to compare published results from
different research groups. Given the constraints of the proposed research, only the
approach using SVR discussed in Section 3.5.2 will be used. However, the research
will investigate the use of various parameters and adaptive techniques to improve the
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accuracy of the estimates.
2.5.2 Integrity
For integrity, the entire flow of information from the raw measurements to the final
processed location must be tamper-proof, or at least any tampering must be de-
tectable. Common means of ensuring integrity include data encryption and signing.
2.5.3 Availability
The location information also needs to be available as and when the need arises. If the
user requires a location-based service at a certain time, availability of the location
information would usually entail data collection and processing before and up to
that time. Availability is usually addressed through the use of managed redundancy.
Certain applications, like health-care or prison and reform, may required continuous
tracking of the mobile nodes and not merely intermittent location information. In
such cases, the location system must be able to deliver continuous availability with
short response times.
2.5.4 Secrecy
Confidentiality is a secondary concern in location systems. In many deployments,
location can be easily observed by third parties, therefore it is less imperative to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the location information or the raw data before processing.
However, standard procedures can and should still be observed to protect the data,
such as ensuring the physical security of the systems, using proper access controls,
and using secure tunnels to encrypt data in transit.
2.6 Applications of a secure location service
2.6.1 Authentication
Since the coverage of a wireless access point is usually an ill-defined area that often
extends beyond the physical boundaries of the region being serviced, it is often useful
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to deny access to users beyond the defined physical boundaries. Thus, instead of
relying on the natural attenuation of the signal to limit access, administrators can
take an active approach by defining precise physical regions in which access is allowed.
Even within a building, it may sometimes be necessary to further partition the
coverage regions. Access by visitors in a public lobby can be limited, while authorized
users within the offices may be granted more permissions.
Location information should be seen as an additional aspect by which to provide
authentication. Unlike passwords or security tokens, location is an aspect of “what
you are” and cannot be faked or stolen. However, like other systems that use complex
data to authenticate, such as biometrics, there is some uncertainty and a potential
for error, so it should not be the only means for authentication.
Unlike other authentication methods, location-based authentication can be done
automatically and transparently[42, 3]. This means it can be done continuously and
would be an additional guarantee against session hijacking attacks.
2.6.2 Billing
Mobile communications providers currently advertise service plans that charge dif-
ferent rates depending on when and where the connection is initiated. Time-based
billing is currently done at a very fine granularity. However, with regards to where
the connection was initiated, service providers usually differentiate at a coarse gran-
ularity between “local” and “long-distance”. With a location system in place, it may
be possible to implement finer-grained billing schemes, should service providers see
the need for this in future.
However, without a secure location system, it would be possible for a customer to
circumvent the imposed zones by modifying the location information that the service




Unlike attackers on a wired local network, attackers compromising a wireless network
cannot easily be traced to a specific physical location from which they connect from.
By using a secure wireless location service, it would be possible to pinpoint the
attacker and take the necessary steps to stop the attacks, such as physical detention
or arrest.
Intrusion detection and response would be impossible if the location service was
utilizing the conventional insecure architecture since it would require that the attacker
inform the system of his or her location based on the radio measurements that the
attacker makes. Requiring such cooperation[20] from the attacker is absurd.
Conversely, location information can also be used as evidence for the innocence of
users in cases where their accounts have been compromised[42, 3].
2.6.4 Ubiquitous applications
In ubiquitous computing applications, the user may be required to authenticate re-
peatedly with the numerous services he or she may encounter. A location-based
authentication system would improve usability by making such authentications trans-
parent[39].
There are other uses for location information in ubiquitous applications, mostly in
the form of user tracking to provide a personalized or optimized service or to facilitate
interactions between users in close physical proximity.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES
Current systems, though varied, do not meet the needs of applications requiring a
secure location service. This research addresses this deficiency through the use of:
Secure architecture A different architecture is proposed and will address the issues
of integrity, availability and secrecy.
More varied wireless network parameters A larger range of network parame-
ters will be utilized to improve the accuracy and integrity of the estimates.
Improved algorithm A more advanced machine learning algorithm will utilize the
additional parameters to produce more accurate estimates. Resolution will also
be improved by use of regression instead of simple classification.
3.1 Secure architecture
Architectures for location information systems have been proposed in [40, 9]. How-
ever, these were designed for large-scale ubiquitous computing applications which
employ multiple technologies such as Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) badges,
infrared sensors, and pressure-sensitive mats.
For this research, the system architecture is a simplification of these large-scale
architectures (Figure 2). It is based on the wireless geolocation system architecture
described in [4] and is similar to the conceptual system design presented in [43].
Unlike [43], this architecture was deliberately chosen for its security possibilities.
The architecture itself does not depend on the network infrastructure, though the
utilization of existing infrastructure is an added advantage for deployment. As such,











Figure 2. Proposed system architecture.
3.2 Functional differences
The architecture differs from the majority of IEEE 802.11 location estimation systems
using the radio map technique in two key respects:
Measurements at sensors The measurements of the radio environment take place
at fixed sensors rather than by the mobile nodes themselves.
Algorithms at location server The location estimation algorithms run at the lo-
cation server than at the mobile nodes. This approach is less common than the
previous.
By eliminating the mobile nodes from the data path of the system, the location
information can be more easily secured. Mobile nodes are in the hands of users and
cannot be trusted as they are easily tampered, but the fixed infrastructure in the
proposed architecture can be physically protected against such tampering. Using
measurements obtained from the mobile node for security applications, such as in
[20], is unacceptable.
The data can be further protected from tampering by using a secure (encrypted
and authenticated) tunnel during transmission and physically securing the sensors.
These details are deployment decisions and entirely optional.
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Relying on the fixed infrastructure to execute the location estimation algorithms
means the algorithms are no longer constrained by the generally poor performance of
the mobile nodes. The mobile nodes are typically battery-powered devices designed
for operational longevity rather than raw computational power. This system also
eliminates the possibility that location information would be unavailable because the
mobile node went offline before it could transmit its results.
This research was limited to the use of Commercial off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware
for IEEE 802.11b networks, utilizing existing infrastructure where possible. Never-
theless, it should be possible to extend the applicability of the results to other similar
networking standards.
Part of the research includes the implementation of the secure architecture (Sec-
tion 3.1) to evaluate its feasibility and as a platform for the next part of the pro-
posed research—the investigation of suitable algorithms (in particular Support Vector
Regression[25, 44]) for secure location estimation.
3.3 Challenges for secure architecture
3.3.1 Scalability
The proposed secure architecture does not scale in the same way as a conventional
architecture. In a conventional architecture, each mobile node performs the measure-
ments and calculations necessary to determine its position. Thus, adding additional
mobile nodes places no additional load on the original system. However, with the
secure architecture, the measurements and calculations are performed centrally. This
potentially leads to problems of scalability as more nodes are added to the system.
One way to overcome this issue is by clustering the central server. Clustering will
also simultaneously improve the availability of the system.
Clustering is practical in this architecture because each mobile node can be tracked
independently of the others. Thus clustering can be done on a per-mobile node basis.
Another alternative for physically expansive deployments is to divide the geographic
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region being covered into overlapping sectors, taking into account the fact that signals
from distant mobile nodes will be detectable at only a fraction of the available sensors.
This process is similar to what was described in [45] but the term “clustering” was
used differently.
Other than scaling with the number of mobile nodes being tracked, the system also
has to scale with the area being monitored. The conventional architecture has each
mobile node monitoring its own small region. The secure architecture would require
the number of sensors deployed to vary with the size of the area being monitored.
This is likely to be a linear scaling.
Scalability and fault tolerance are difficult to verify experimentally in a small set
up that is the scope of this research. However, with modest resource requirements,
most location systems should exhibit linear scaling of processing and storage require-
ments with the number of nodes being tracked and the number of requests—hardly
unreasonable.1 The secure architecture will also exhibit this characteristic.
3.3.2 Signal Variations
Various wireless network interfaces exhibit different transmission powers. These may
range from 15 dBi to 25 dBi. The system must compensate for this large variance in
transmission power when using the RSS for location estimation.
Currently, values are normalized to eliminate the effects of transmission power
variances. Preliminary tests indicate that after normalization, the system is rea-
sonably tolerance to hardware variations. Additional testing is needed to determine
the effectiveness of normalization over the entire range of transmission powers for
consumer hardware.
The orientation of the mobile devices have been known to affect the RSS[46]. Two
1An example where resource requirements increase faster than linearly are when the algorithms
rely on the positions of the neighboring nodes, and the number of neighboring nodes increase linearly
with the total number of nodes. Such a system would have O[N2] complexity but rarely occurs in
practice.
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factors contribute to this observation: the directionality of the antenna used, and the
presence of the user’s body.
Most mobile devices utilize either a plug-in wireless network card or a built-in
wireless interface. In the case of a plug-in card, these typically use a microstrip patch
antenna integrated directly on the PCB. These antennae are directional in nature.
Built-in systems may use an antenna which resembles a dipole, usually in the form
of a wire running around the edge of the screen. Though these dipole antennae
may be omnidirectional in the horizontal plane (the vertical axis is usually a lesser
concern), the implementation in mobile devices tends to exhibit directionality due
to the shielding effects of the device’s case and other components in the device. In
larger and newer devices, built-in antennae may resemble patch antennae instead of
dipoles.
The human body, though not a perfect occluder, does pose as a measurable at-
tenuator to RF signals. In a typical set up, the user’s body would attenuate signals
in a small but non-negligible sector.
Another concern is the use of antenna diversity. Fortunately, most current IEEE
802.11 mobile systems currently utilize only one antenna. If, in future, multi-antenna
configurations become more popular, the performance of the current system may
suffer. The use of antenna diversity may result in sudden changes in the RSS as the
antenna is switched. However, the algorithms can be adapted to make use of antenna
diversity to improve measurements.
3.4 Threat model
Various attacks are possible on a IEEE 802.11 location system[47, 48]. The secure
architecture proposed above should be able to address most of these threats if properly
implemented. The possible threats are discussed below.
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3.4.1 Physical access
A physical compromise of the system may result in the location data being modified.
Fortunately, the physical security of the proposed architecture is enhanced with re-
spect to the conventional user-centric architecture. The only data from the user is the
radio signal itself (threats concerning the radio signal are discussed in the following
sections) so the entire data path can be easily secured against physical access.
3.4.2 Spoofing
Given the numerous factors which affect the measured radio signal and the relatively
small measurement space of each signal characteristic, there is a possibility that sig-
nals from one location may be misinterpreted as being from another location. This
has been called signal aliasing[46].
This may occur unintentionally or, more importantly, intentionally as a result of a
conscious attempt to manipulate the signal and to create a fake presence (spoofing)[29].
A system relying on only one metric for measuring the signal would be easily vulner-
able to signal aliasing. However, it is suggested that as the number of measured pa-
rameters increase, the likelihood of aliasing decreases; from an attacker’s perspective,
the complexity of simulating a signal increases. With a good selection of parameters,
an attempt at faking a location would require nothing short of gaining physical access
to the sensors themselves and directly generating a signal at each one.
3.4.3 Flooding
Another less subtle way of affecting the radio signal is through flooding. Flooding
attacks are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that result from the system being over-
loaded with large amounts on “nonsense” data that it is unable to process legitimate
data and requests.
There are two primary methods of attacking a IEEE 802.11 network using flooding
attacks. The first is by jamming the radio signals using a high-powered transmitter
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operating on the same frequency. The second is by exploiting the unauthenticated
management frames in the IEEE 802.11 standard in what is known as a deauthenti-
cation attack[49].
Unfortunately, all current IEEE 802.11 networks are susceptible to jamming at-
tacks and this means that a location system based on such technology will also be
vulnerable. However, this form of attack is not commonly used and the IEEE 802.11
standards committee has not made any plans to adopt physical standards that would
be resistant to such attacks.
The proposed architecture is not susceptible to the deauthentication attack (and
related variants such as Request-To-Send (RTS)/Clear-To-Send (CTS) flooding) since
it is passively listening to signals and not processing them using the full IEEE 802.11
standard. Being invulnerable to the attack means the system can actually be used to
localize the source of the attack.
3.5 Algorithms
Much current research in IEEE 802.11 location systems focus on improving the ac-
curacy of the system through the use of complex algorithms. However, as observed
earlier, these systems utilize an architecture in which the measurements are done by
the mobile node itself. This research focuses on a secure server-centric architecture
where measurements are done using distributed sensors and algorithms executed at
a centralized server. Furthermore, little research has been done on the efficiency of
these algorithms on the secure architecture.
There are several requirements for the algorithms in this architecture:
Accuracy The algorithms must be able to provide satisfactory resolution and good
accuracy.
Robustness The algorithms should be able to function even in the typically dynamic
conditions of real-world wireless networks.
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Additionally, for the purpose of this research, the algorithms should rely on mini-
mal hardware specifications. This would allow them to be extended to other wireless
networking technologies.
Even though the system is designed to test various algorithms, this research will
focus only on one algorithm, leaving the other possibilities as avenues for further
research.
3.5.1 Location estimation
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, the radio map technique used here creates a map
of the environment, with each location having a radio fingerprint—a unique set of
measurements such as signal strength, RTT, etc (discussed in greater detail in Section
3.6). When presented with a radio fingerprint, the system should be able to determine
the location from that.
However, as was also mentioned, the matching is not straightforward since there
are variations in the fingerprints for any given location due to a variety of factors.
Furthermore, the radio map is usually obtained through empirical measurements,
thus limiting the practical resolution of the map.
With regards to the first problem, where the measured fingerprint does not exactly
match any previously measured fingerprint, common techniques using algorithms such
as KNN, HMM, or Support Vector Machine (SVM) try to obtain the closest matching
fingerprint by attempting to minimize the error. In effect, each measurement that
comprises the fingerprint represents a dimension (or a feature).
KNN algorithm that finds an arbitrary k nearest neighbors to a given point using
the Gaussian distance and determines what class (the location) the majority of these
points belong to. In Figure 3, the four nearest neighbors to the red point are found,
and it is determined that majority class is black, though the absolute nearest neighbor
is actually gray. Unfortunately, nearest neighbor searches scale exponentially with
each additional dimension. Furthermore, KNN weights each dimension equally when
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Figure 3. KNN in two dimensions.
calculating the Gaussian distance. Thus a proper solution requires a more complex
algorithm.
The second problem is the limited resolution of the map due to the practical
limitations of obtaining samples. A possible solution would be to perform a regression
on the data to obtain a curve (or rather, a hyperplane, since there are more than
two dimensions) that represents the variations of the radio map in relation to spatial
coordinates. Figure 5 shows an example of how regression would help with “filling in”
the missing parts of the map. Also note the many-to-one mapping of signal strength to
location, which occurs often in empirical measurements. Differentiating each location
would thus require the consideration of other measurements, such as signal strengths
from other sensors, or the RTT, etc—in other words, the regression and subsequent
evaluation has to occur in the full multi-dimensional space. In the next section, we
examine support vectors, which were used for this regression calculation.
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Figure 4. Simple regression for improved resolution.
22
3.5.2 Support Vectors
The Support Vector method of machine learning was selected for the estimation al-
gorithm. This algorithm is general-purpose and has been used for various purposes
such as image recognition and data mining. The Support Vector method was chosen
because the models it generates encompass the functionality of a significant pro-
portion of neural networks, Radial Basis Function (RBF) networks, and polynomial
classifiers[50]. The simplicity and flexibility afforded by the Support Vector method
thus makes it ideal when exploring the myriad parameters available in the location
estimation system.
Support Vectors can be used to either classify data or perform regression analysis.
Using Support Vectors as classifiers (often called SVM) would limit the granularity
of the results to only those points surveyed. However, with regression (the technique
used in this research), it is possible to interpolate between the measured values,
potentially providing a higher resolution than the empirical measurements[36]. Un-
fortunately, there would still be limitations to the regression given the small signal
variations. Extensive analysis of the use of SVRs for location estimation can be found
in [25].
[44, 30] suggest using different radio maps to account for the changing radio envi-
ronment at various times of the day. The maps were selected based on environmental
probes. This system will also use environmental probes. However, instead of explicitly
selecting the particular map to use based on the probes, the system will combine the
measurements of the the mobile nodes and probes into a single tuple for regression.
The Support Vectors are complex algorithms with a variety of parameters. As
mentioned earlier, the Support Vector method is being used for regression to estimate
the x- and y-coordinates independently. The learning algorithm in SVR is used to
minimize a convex function, but in this case, the goal is to fit the function to the




Figure 5. SVM classification in two dimensions.
form f(x) =
∑n
i=1 φ(xj)w + b, where n is the dimension of the input space, φ is the
mapping to feature space, w is the weight factor, and b is the bias.
The Support Vector method transforms a high-dimensional feature space with a
kernel function to a lower-dimensional space suitable for linear classification or regres-
sion as seen in Figure 5. There are several commonly used kernel functions: linear,
polynomial, sigmoid, and RBF. Though the choice of kernel would directly affect
the function form of the final estimate and the performance of the SVM, practical
results from various researchers have indicated the final support vectors generated by
each kernel overlap significantly. Thus the choice of kernel based is less affected by
functional form than it seems[50]. Furthermore, the nature of SVM training makes
it computationally expensive to use kernels with more than a few parameters.
Many systems use the RBF kernel because of its generality (the behavior of the
linear, polynomial, and sigmoid kernels are similar to the RBF kernel for certain
parameters) and because it experiences less numerical difficulties (large degree poly-
nomial kernels have asymptotic cases and sigmoid kernels are invalid for certain
parameters)[51]. Each kernel has a several parameters that describe it (see Table
1). From there, another benefit of using the RBF kernel can be observed: only one
parameter, the Gaussian width (represented by γ in Figure 5), is necessary, thus
24






making its application relatively easier.
It is necessary to define a loss function to accommodate small errors (noise in the
samples, possibly from experimental errors) in order to obtain a suitable generaliza-
tion, as depicted in Figure 6. This is the ε-insensitive loss function[52]. The deviation
of the training samples is represented by the slack variable ξ. However, minimizing ξ
alone is insufficient to obtain a suitable generalization. It is also necessary to reduce
the model complexity, and thus increase its ability to predict novel values. This is
done by adjusting two parameters, C and ε which in turn affect the “flatness” of the
regression curve. It is important to reduce C as far as possible as in has a prominent
effect on the execution time of the SVR.
The RBF kernel was chosen for this analysis, given its generality. All factors
considered, SVR tuning requires only the adjustment of C, ε, and the RBF kernel
parameter γ[53, 54].
Manual adjustment of these parameters will yield fair results. The best values
would be obtained through an exhaustive search through all parameters with cross-
validation using several subsets of the entire training data set. Obviously this is far
from practical. [51] recommends a grid-search approach with the possibility of en-
hancing accuracy by adaptively adjusting the grid resolution based on the resultant





Figure 6. SVM classification with slack variables for classification errors.
of being easier to parallelize. There is less concern that it may miss key values un-
like other more efficient but also more complex methods. [54] discusses an analytic
approach to parameter selection given the properties of the input data and [55] de-
scribes tuning methods using evolutionary algorithms. The analytic approach will be
examined briefly in the discussion (Section 5.7).
The training process itself requires the solution of a very large Quadratic Program-
ming (QP) optimization problem. Various methods have been proposed to reduce this
large QP problem and its corresponding computational complexity. The most pop-
ular of these approaches is Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO)[56, 57] and its
variants. SMO partitions the original QP problem to several smaller ones which can
then be solved analytically. This avoids expensive operations on large matrices, re-
sulting in linear scaling of memory requirements and, at worst, quadratic scaling of
computational time.
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Fortunately, most of the required functionality can be found in the LIBSVM[53].
LIBSVM implements ε-SVR and ν-SVR, uses a variant of SMO, and provides tools
for cross-validation and grid-search. Both SVRs were evaluated.
Feature selection is another aspect of the Support Vector method that bears con-
sideration. The list of features is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.6. Obviously,
the number of features used would affect the speed of the SVR and ideally, the SVR
should use an absolute minimum number of features. However, finding the minimum
set of these features which can be used to reliably estimate location requires searching
over all possible subsets.
To avoid the brute force approach, various standard search techniques can be ap-
plied. Fortunately, given configuration of the system, there are only a relatively small
number of features available, compared to the thousands which may be used in ap-
plications like pattern recognition. Hill climbing is probably the easiest to implement
with minimal heuristics but it is grossly inefficient in certain landscapes. More ad-
vanced algorithms utilizing forward selection or backward elimination would be more
efficient but the complexity offsets most potential speed gains. Discussion of such
algorithms lie beyond the scope of this research.
3.6 Wireless network parameters
Current location estimation systems rely only on a limited subset of parameters to
aid location detection. This research combines the various parameters in an attempt
to improve the prediction accuracy of the system.
The use of COTS hardware in implementing the architecture would restrict the
use of advanced radio measurement techniques to the lowest common denominator
available. This would ensure the portability of the algorithms to other wireless net-
working standards such as IEEE 802.11a, 802.11g and Bluetooth.
For the purpose of location estimation using radio measurements, parameters may
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Table 2. List of features to be investigated
Feature Source
Signal strength Mobile nodes
Signal strength Sensor probes
Noise level Environment (Global)
Frame RTT Mobile nodes
include the RSS measured at each sensor, the probe RSS, and the environment noise




This research is concerned as much with the feasibility of the proposed secure archi-
tecture as with the performance of the algorithms.
4.1 Implementation overview
The training phase requires several steps. Figure 7 shows the data flow of the training
phase. Similarly, after training, the online phase when the system is in operation also
requires several levels of processing (Figure 8).
In the training phase, data is collected from the sensors and the surveyor. Given
the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the sensors and surveyor, the system
then filters the sensor data to obtain the appropriate sensor readings. In the correla-
tion step, the various sensor readings are recombined to form the necessary features
(environmental probes, RTT, etc) for the training. The data is also scaled and nor-
malized to give remove bias and better results with the SVR. Finally, training of the
SVR is done using values derived from the grid-search algorithm and this produces
a model for the SVR, comprising of the necessary support vectors that describe the
data.
For the online phase, readings from the sensors are collected. The system is also
given the MAC addresses of the mobile nodes being tracked. As before, the readings
will be combined and filtered to produce streams of data representing the sensor
measurements of the mobile nodes and of the environmental probes. The correlate
and scale step is also similar to the training phase, selecting the appropriate features
and scaling them to match the scaling used in the training phase. These values
and the SVR model are presented to the SVR algorithm to produce a prediction.
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Figure 8. Online data flow.
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system.
Many of the processing stages are similar between both the training and online
phases. All these stages will occur in the “Server” module in the architecture (Figure
1). The stages will be described in detail in the following sections.
4.2 Server
The server encapsulates most of the functionality and is the central point of control
for the system. To facilitate easy management, a GUI administrative console was
created for the server. It provides the following capabilities:
• Monitor sensor availability and data
• Collect site survey data
• Filter and manipulate the data
• Visualize the data
• Adjust algorithm parameters
• Train algorithms
• Test algorithm accuracy
The interface of the GUI console can be seen in Appendix A.
4.3 Sensors
The sensors are low-end Pentium PCs with an IEEE 802.11b card and running Linux.
Their sole purpose is to obtain measurements of the radio environment. The sensor
program, written in C++, together with the Host AP drivers[58], capture all wireless
traffic on a specified channel.
The drivers are able to provide a wealth of information through the PRISM mon-
itoring header (identified as ARPHRD IEEE80211 PRISM in various source code).
32
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
08 00 Duration BSSID (ab ad be e0 00 49) Source
Destination (a0 de ad 0b ee f0) Frag/Seq ff ff . . .
Dummy data
Figure 9. Probe frame layout.
Of concern is the signal strength, noise level, and MAC time. These three values,
together with the source MAC address and destination MAC address are parsed by
the software and sent to the sensor collector.
There are three sensors deployed on the third floor of the College of Computing
Building (CCB) in Georgia Tech (Refer to Appendix B). While three sensors are
deployed, it is possible to filter the measurements in software to simulate the use of
only one or two of the sensors.
While it is possible to configure the sensors for completely passive monitoring,
the current set up has each sensor broadcast a probe frame. These probe frames are
IEEE 802.11 frames that can be easily identified by their contents. The layout of
each probe frame is shown in Figure 9.
The duration and fragment/sequence fields are calculated and set automatically
by the firmware. The source field, as is normally the case, contains the MAC address
of the sensor broadcasting the probe. The other fields (Basic Service Set IDentifier
(BSSID), destination, and data) are used to uniquely identify the frame as a probe.
Since the sensors are at fixed locations, the fluctuations in signal characteristics
of the probes originating from each sensor are an indication of changes in the radio
environment. This data will be utilized by the algorithm later for refining the location
estimations.
The rate at which the probes are sent is tunable, but is currently set to 120
seconds.
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As noted earlier, it is possible to secure the data by providing physical security
at the sensors and information security through the use of secure tunnels. Because
of Information Technology policies at the deployment location, the data was secured
using an Secure SHell (SSH) tunnel and the sensors themselves were placed in rooms
with restricted access. This set up provides a reasonable level of security by encrypting
the data and providing limited authentication at the end-points (sensors and server).
4.4 Data collection
4.4.1 Site survey
The datasets for both training and evaluation are subsets of a larger dataset com-
prising of multiple measurements accumulated over several days. The data collection
process will also be referred to as the site survey.
A laptop and a PDA were used for the site survey, each using a different wireless
card. This variety was used to evaluate the ability of the system to handle the
significantly different radio characteristics of each device. The site survey software,
written in Java, runs on the laptop.
The survey process comprises of the user going to fixed locations and indicating
these locations on the survey software. The survey software will then convey this
location to the database and the information will be correlated with radio measure-
ments of the survey system at that instant in time. When this is repeated over several
locations at different times of the day, thus building a map which relates the location
of the device to a particular set of radio measurements.
The locations at which measurements were taken is indicated in Appendix C.
Both laptop and PDA ran ping with a 1 KB payload (ping -s 1024 www.google.com)
to ensure that the sensors will have adequate opportunity to detect their signal. Since
the survey software would not run on the PDA, the PDA was placed close to the lap-
top for each measurement, so that the location of the laptop indicated in the survey
software would also reflect the location of the PDA.
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As mentioned earlier, the site survey was done at different times of the day. This
was to obtain measurements of the same location when the radio environment is
potentially different due to the presence of human and other environmental factors.
Measurements were taken during the middle of the day when the building was most
crowded, during the evening when it was minimally occupied, and in the middle of
the weekend when it is nearly deserted.
Survey readings were taken at various orientations. However, the software does not
take note of the orientation of the user, so no data is available as to how orientation
affects the measurements. Instead, readings from the different orientations will be
used together to see if the system can be made insensitive to the orientation of the
user.
In all, 3,267,197 sensor readings were collected, which were filtered and correlated
to form 12,724 data points for the next stages.
4.4.2 Normalization
Normalization of the data eliminates the dependence of the algorithms on certain
units of measure. Furthermore, the units used in reporting signal strength and noise
levels by the PRISM monitoring header are ambiguous.
However, even with normalization, there is the issue of representing the lack of a
data point, i.e. when a sensor is unable to detect any signal from the mobile node at
a certain location. It was decided that the values would be normalized to a range of
[0, 1], with 0 representing the lowest detected level. If there were no readings available,
it is represented with −1 to differentiate that from the case where a minimum reading
was available.
Different wireless network interfaces have different characteristics such as trans-
mission power and directionality. Despite this, it is expected that the different net-
work cards will still exhibit similar variations in signal strength with respect to loca-
tion. This hypothesis was tested in the implementation.
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4.4.3 Round-trip time
Unlike signal and noise levels, the RTT of the nodes are not directly reported by the
wireless hardware. [35] proposes a method using the high-resolution MAC timestamps
on RTS/CTS frame pairs as a measure of RTT, since these are handled rapidly by
the wireless hardware, thus eliminating other potential sources of variation.
Since the MAC timestamps have microsecond resolution, one would reasonably
conclude that the smallest distance measurable using the RTT delay is 3× 108 m/s×
1µs/2 = 150 m. However, [35] suggests that stochastic resonance may result from the
clock quantization and thus allow a greater resolution (less than 150 m) than this.
Stochastic resonance is commonly applied to biological and other “chaotic” sys-
tems. It relies on a known noise distribution which is added to the signal. This
added noise will cause the measured signal to alternate between two quantized mea-
surements. The distribution of the alternating measurements is dependent on the
measured signal (in terms of fractions of a quantum). Thus observation of distri-
bution of alternating measurements can aid in the resolution of the measurements.
The RTS/CTS frame exchanges in an infrastructure network happen between the
mobile node and access point. To be able to record both frames for RTT estimation
requires that the sensor be able to receive signals from both mobile node and access
point. Conventional radio-fingerprinting techniques relying on signal and noise levels
only require the mobile nodes to be within detection range. This method thus limits
the sensor deployment, or would suffer from having much less useful data than conven-
tional radio-fingerprinting techniques. It may be possible to reduce the constraints
somewhat, i.e. a rapid string of consecutive data frames, initiated by a RTS, or a
string of ACK frames initiated by a CTS. However, this requires that the fragments
being transmitted are all of identical size. While this is most often the case, it is not
guaranteed by the IEEE specifications[1].
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[35] utilized RTT measurements both in- and outdoors and noted that the indoor
set up was far less accurate, probably because of multi-path effects. It is likely that
this issue would also manifest itself in this research.
4.5 Algorithms
4.5.1 Algorithm framework
The proposed algorithm framework is designed as a test platform for various esti-
mation algorithms. It prepares the data from both the database and sensors for
processing by the algorithms and then interprets the results from the algorithm for
the visualization system.
The proposed algorithm framework eliminates the dependence on variables such as
the specific identity of the mobile nodes being tracked, the physical units of position
and radio signal quality.
4.5.2 Identification of mobile nodes
The proposed system identifies and distinguishes mobile nodes using the IEEE 802.11
MAC address in the header of each and every frame transmitted by the nodes[1, 2].
This has the weakness of being susceptible to spoofing attacks. Future research may
address this issue through the use of a unique identifying key in each frame, possibly
derived from a cipher stream, or by using unique identifying characteristics of the
hardware such as sequence numbering patterns or clock drift. In the mean time, it
may be possible to detect spoofing attempts as any other wireless spoofing attack—by
detecting the abnormal variation in the physical location of the actual node and the
attacking node.
4.5.3 SVR training
SVR training is a computationally intensive process, especially when the grid-search
algorithm is used to optimize the SVR training parameters. As such, it was necessary
to extensively exploit the implicit parallelism of the grid-search algorithm to obtain
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results quickly.
The grid-search module in the server dispatches training jobs to a pool of clients.
Since the LIBSVM[53] code is easily ported, the server could utilize a wide range of
systems for the pool of clients. The experimental set up used had up to four PCs
in the pool, each averaging the performance of 2.5GHz Intel PC. The dispatch code
was constructed robustly so as to recover from client failures and allow clients to join
and leave the pool during training.
Even with these resources, each data set took about one day to train and optimize.
Each data set was optimized first using a coarse grid covering a medium-sized region
of space. Depending on the results, a finer, smaller grid or coarser, larger grid may
be selected for further iterations. The process is repeated until the optimal training
parameters can be determined, i.e. the optimal parameters and optimal correlation
coefficient is stable at different granularities. The parameters for each iteration were
configured through the server GUI console.
LIBSVM provides a simple means of doing n-fold cross validation. All results were
obtained using two-fold cross validation. Unfortunately, the LIBSVM scripts only
performs grid-search on SVMs, not SVRs. A grid-search on an SVR has the added
complexity of an extra parameter, resulting in a search in 3D space and had to be
accomplished via a custom script. Visualization of the grid-search multi-dimensional





The following results may be represented by the Mean Squared Error (MSE). The
MSE is simply the square of the RMS of the error.
The training data points and testing data points are taken from the same grid of
survey points. The n-fold cross validation described previously selects a fraction of
the survey data to use for training and testing. Thus the location of the test points
would coincide with the training points—effectively the SVR in this simple set up
would only have to determine which point on the grid a given set of test data falls
on, thus work as a classifier (Figure 10a). However, given the ability for the SVR
to interpolate between the training points, it may produce predictions that are not
aligned to the grid (Figure 10b). Furthermore, the predicted points tend to be close
to the original grid. This results in very small MSEs.
In some cases, the SVR will make an entirely wrong prediction that places the
predicted point nearer to a completely different point on the grid—in other words,
misclassifying the point. Because of the number of test points used, the MSE will





Figure 10. SVR predictions performing as classifiers.
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still be relatively small because of the averaging.
It is important to note that the MSE does not indicate the resolution of the system
when used this way, only how far the predicted points vary from the original test and
training data (i.e., the accuracy). Since the test data is given at approximately 3-
foot intervals (Section 4.4.1), it cannot be concluded if the SVR can resolve (i.e.,
differentiate) distances smaller than this because the predicted locations will cluster
around each of the original training points.
5.2 Signal Map
The signal maps collected for this research represent a large amount of data. Each
map would cover the 245 sample points at different times and be different for each
sensor. However, to provide an idea of how the signal varies in the environment, a
signal map for the sensor in room 331 (marked by an “X”) late in the evening is show
in Figure 11.
5.3 Hardware variations
Variations in the radio performance of the laptop and PDA can be see in Figure 12,
which plots their measured RSS values against each other to show the correlation.
The data plotted are the signal strengths of the laptop and PDA measured at the
sensor whenever values for both devices are simultaneously available. As mentioned
earlier (Section 4.4.2), the PRISM monitoring header uses unspecified units. Various
unofficial sources indicate that the units are on the order of dBi, but the absolute
values may vary depending on the firmware version. Fortunately, since the measure-
ments are done by the same sensors, the units are unimportant and only the relative
values matter. Furthermore, these values will be normalized before being used with
the SVR.
The correlation coefficient for the two datasets is large (approximately 0.9957),
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which indicates that the signals from the different wireless cards vary in a similar
fashion. With the appropriate normalization, it would be possible for the estimation
algorithm to function with different wireless cards without recalibration. Future work
may investigate a larger selection of wireless network cards to confirm this.
5.4 Signal and noise levels
The estimation algorithms were initially trained with only the sensor data for the
surveyor, i.e. no environmental probes or RTT, using both ε- and ν-SVRs. The
ν-SVR was extremely sensitive to the training parameters, and execution time would
increase abruptly for certain values, making grid-search difficult.
The results of the ε-SVR are shown in Figures 13 and 14 for the x- and y-
coordinates. The results of the ν-SVR are shown in Figures 15 and 16. Some graphs
are similar but are plotted over different regions of search space. The final training
parameters are listed in Table 3. If several parameters give the same results, the
one with the lowest C, and thus the fastest, was selected. In the plots, the corre-
lation coefficient is indicated by the size (larger cubes indicate higher correlation)
and color (color legend is alongside the graph) of the cubes, and small black cubes
indicate where data was unavailable, usually because the training process took too
long. Also, the parameter values with the highest correlation coefficient are indicated
with translucent red cubes. Note that the axes are log2, which corresponds directly
with the grid-search algorithm, and that the values for each of the parameters are
unitless, since the input data has been normalized to be likewise unitless.
Plots of the predicted versus actual normalized (unitless) locations for the ε-SVR
are shown in Figure 17 for the best training parameters as determined by the grid-
search. The plots indicate a fair correlation (MSE of 0.00573 and 0.00537 for the x-
and y-axis respectively) between the predicted and actual locations with little error
and agrees well with a similar, more extensive test performed in [37]. Unfortunately,
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the excessive training times of the ν-SVR ruled out its practical use.
While Figure 17 shows good accuracy of approximately 1.11 feet, this was the re-
sult of testing all the training data against an SVR model that was produced likewise.
However, the regression method was chosen to improve the apparent resolution of the
radio map. To this end, it appears to be successful. To test this, certain data points
were removed from the training data to create a coarser survey grid. Figure 18 plots
selected estimates from the algorithm given a coarse grid of survey data. The ◦ points
are those used to train the algorithm, while the × points are those predicted by the
algorithm. 4 indicates the actual location. Locations marked with 4 were not used
in training the SVR, but only in the testing phase. Deviations are larger than in
Figure 17 because less data points were used in the training.
5.5 Environmental probes
The second set of tests were performed with the inclusion of environmental probe
information. In contrast to methods in [26], the probes were not used to select a
specific radio map, but were included as part of a general map. This would potentially
allow the estimation algorithms to interpolate between the surveyed radio conditions.
The training results of the ε-SVR with environmental probes are presented in Figures
19 and 20, while those for the ν-SVR are shown in Figures 21 and 22. Figure 23
shows the accuracy of the ε-SVR predictions and the improvement in accuracy is
immediately apparent. The MSE of the x- and y-axis are 1.02×10−6 and 0.189×10−6
respectively, which translate to a virtually negligible distance of 0.000125 feet. As
noted earlier, the MSE is obtained by averaging the error distances over the large
number of sample points. This does not necessarily imply that the system may
resolve such tiny distances, only that virtually all predicted locations coincided with
the training points. In fact, the MSE would undoubtedly be larger if the system was
tested with samples from locations that did not coincide with the 3-foot training grid,
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as was tested in Section 5.4.
5.6 Round-trip time
Given the additional constraints imposed when obtaining the RTT for radio-finger-
printing (Section 4.4.3), it comes as no surprise that there is little suitable RTT data
in the experimental dataset. A total of 31 data points were extracted from the entire
dataset, far too little for any meaningful purpose.
The problem was compounded by the small ping payload used (Section 4.4.1).
The default RTS threshold for PRISM cards on Linux is 2,432 bytes [58]. Frames
below this size are sent without requiring RTS/CTS exchange [1, 2]. The ping payload
of 1,024 bytes, even with IP and IEEE 802.11 headers, is less than 2,000 bytes, and
thus, few RTS/CTS pairs were generated by the survey equipment.
In an attempt to increase the RTT data available for the location estimation algo-
rithm, the constraints were relaxed to include frames sent in rapid succession. 1,053
data points were extracted using this criteria and used with the location estimation
algorithm.
The grid search results for RTT is shown in Figures 24 and 25. The final values
and correlation coefficients are in Table 3.
5.7 Comparison
Table 3 compares the performance of each set of features and the SVR types.
Using the ν-SVR requires much a longer training time than the ε-SVR but yields
similar accuracy. Thus, it is recommended that only the ε-SVR be used.
Environmental probes prove to have a significant positive impact on accuracy.
Given the different environmental conditions in which the data was collected, some
variation in the sensor readings was expected. With the use of environmental probes,





coefficientProbes RTT C γ ε or ν
No No
ε
x 2 11 -12 0.8635
y 3 9 7 0.9272
ν
x 10 10 0 0.8656
y 4 9 0 0.9244
Yes No
ε
x 7 5 -10 0.9969
y 13 5 -13 0.9981
ν
x 6 5 0 0.9969
y 5 4 -2 0.9979
No Yes ε
x -2 8 -6 0.6196
y 0 8 -4 0.5266
Table 3. Summary of optimal SVR parameters and results.
accurate predictions.
It can be seen from these results that using the RTT does little to improve the
quality of the predictions. This is expected given the limited quality of the data.
Further testing with better data would probably be needed before the utility of RTT
in an indoor environment can be concluded. However, based on the data collected
for this research, the use of RTT cannot be recommended.
Also, it is interesting to note that the optimal parameters for the SVRs obtained
by the grid-search method differ significantly from those predicted by the analytic
method from [54]. For example, using the analytic method on the x-axis data, we
obtain:






for the ε-SVR without environmental probes or RTT, where ȳ and σy are the mean
and standard deviation of the training responses respectively, τ is an empirically






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12. Correlation between signal strengths of different wireless NICs.





Figure 14. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for
y-coordinate for ε-SVR.
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Figure 15. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for
x-coordinate for ν-SVR.
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Figure 19. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for




Figure 20. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for




Figure 21. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and ν for
x-coordinate with environmental probes using ν-SVR.
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Figure 22. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and ν for























































































































Figure 23. Plot of predicted versus actual locations with environmental probes for a)
x-coordinate and b) y-coordinate.
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Figure 24. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for
x-coordinate with RTT using ε-SVR.
Figure 25. Plot of cross-validation rate against training parameters C, γ, and p for




The goal was to develop a location estimation system capable of providing secure
location information. To that end, this research has succeeded.
The system developed demonstrates that the secure architecture (Section 3.1)
oriented around a central server is workable. Furthermore, the implementation is
robust (Sections 5.3 and 5.4) and accurate, especially with the use of additional
radio environment features (Section 5.7). SVRs proved to be accurate enough for
the task (Section 5.7), often correctly identifying the location of the mobile node.
The SVRs have the added advantage of being able to interpolate over un-surveyed
regions (Section 5.4), though with limited accuracy, thus limiting the resolution of the
system to that of the survey grid. However, attempts to utilize the RTT to improve
the accuracy of system failed.
The shortcomings of the system include the inconvenient site survey and the long
training time.
There are a number of ways the research can be extended. Future work can focus
on the improvement of the estimation algorithms, the robustness of the system to
various physical extremes, or increasing the security of the system.
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, various algorithms can be used to provide the
estimates. While [25] provides some comparison of their accuracy and algorithmic
complexity, it does so without considering other practical concerns. Also, the sys-
tem being implemented will not use time averaging, a common technique used to
improve the accuracy of estimates[60, 36]. Time averaging can be incorporated into
the algorithms as future work.
The training time for the SVRs was noted to be extremely long, most cases requir-
ing approximately one day when training was performed on a small cluster, or several
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days if performed on a single system. Each case also requires human intervention to
interpret the results and determine the best set of parameters for the SVR. Further-
more, site survey and training will have to be done regularly as the radio environment
changes, and each time the SVR will have to be retrained with the new data. The
problem will be exacerbated as the number of sensors increase, which would increase
the feature space and thus the training time for each iteration of training.
The most time-consuming portion would be the brute-force grid-search approach.
There have been other methods proposed for SVR parameter tuning[51, 55], and these
should be investigated further.
Another common method of addressing the issue of a large feature space is through
the use of Support Vector Machine-Recursive Feature Elimination (SVM-RFE), a
technique popular in bio-informatics where the feature space is in the thousands [61].
Further methods of optimizing SVMs are documented in [62], but these will have to
be adapted slightly for use with SVRs.
Fortunately, the training time for SVRs decreases correspondingly with the size
of the input data. Based on [37], the granularity of the site survey can be reduced
significantly without much impact on estimation accuracy when SVRs are used. Re-
duced granularity would reduce the number of data points and thus the training time
of the SVR.
From in implementation perspective, a promising alternative to LIBSVM is LIBSVMTL[63].
This library includes certain optimizations over LIBSVM but, for now, still lacks cer-
tain crucial functions.
Current systems use a map from a site survey done specifically for that purpose.
This map is static and is never updated with new information. One possible research
area would focus on updating this map based on new measurements of the mobile
nodes done at run time. Similarly, the training time would be amortized over the
extended training period, thus reducing the initial training time.
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Few tests have been done on the accuracy of the map in the face of variations in
wireless hardware. Commercial deployments would generally have to tolerate such
variations, but there are no published results from commercial systems. More hard-
ware configurations could be evaluated.
As mentioned in Section 4.5.2, the mobile nodes are currently identified using their
MAC address. This is easily spoofed by attackers. Alternative methods of identifying





Figure 26. Sensor list.
Figure 27. Sensor filters.
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Figure 28. SVR training settings.
Figure 29. Map visualization for survey, training, and testing data.
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Figure 30. Sensor monitoring settings.
Figure 31. Raw sensor data table.
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Figure 32. Correlated sensor data table.
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APPENDIX B
MAP OF SENSOR LOCATIONS
Three sensors have been deployed on the third floor of the College of Computing





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MAP OF LOCATIONS FOR SITE SURVEY
Survey readings were taken at six-foot intervals in areas that were accessible. While
attempts were made to take readings at the same locations over each sampling inter-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Angle of Arrival (AOA)
4






Denial of Service (DoS)
18
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
3
Geographic Information System (GIS)
3
Global Positioning System (GPS)
See [10]. 3, 4






Programming library for Support Vector Machine (SVM)/Support Vector Re-
gression (SVR) functions[53]. 27, 38, 59, 71
LIBSVMTL
Programming library for SVM/SVR functions, supposedly faster than LIBSVM[63].
59
Line of Sight (LOS)
4
Media Access Control (MAC)
29, 33, 36, 37, 60
Multiple In/Multiple Out (MIMO)
The draft IEEE 802.11n standard that uses multiple antennae to “shape” the
radio signal to boost the signal strength and thus the transmission speeds. 6
Mean Squared Error (MSE)





Radial Basis Function (RBF)






Received Signal Strength (RSS)
Signal strength at the receiver. 4–7, 16, 17, 28, 40
Request-To-Send (RTS)
19, 36, 43
Round Trip Time (RTT)
6, 20, 21, 28, 29, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO)
A faster alternative training method for SVMs[56, 57]. 26, 27
Secure SHell (SSH)
34
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Statistical method used for pattern recognition and classification[64, 50]. 20,
23, 24, 38, 59, 71, 72
Support Vector Machine-Recursive Feature Elimination (SVM-RFE)
59
Support Vector Regression (SVR)
Statistical method used for regression analysis of multi-dimensional data sets[64].
1, 9, 23, 25, 27, 29, 37–44, 58, 59, 71
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